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"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses...
The wretched refuse...
Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tost to me ......
tGlravely disabled means... [a] condition in which a person, as a
result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal
needs for food, clothing or shelter .... 2
INTRODUCTION: CALIFORIoA's MENTAL HEALTH EXPERIMENT
Twelve years ago a California legislative subcommittee issued a
report entitled The Dilemma of Mental Commitments in California-
A Background Document.3 Questioning the legal, moral, and practi-
cal worth of California's civil commitment laws-and by implication
those in all other states-the report recommended fundamental
changes in the commitment system. Through the civil commitment
* Professor of Law and Acting Dean (1977-1978), University of San Diego.
B.A., 1962; J.D., 1964, Syracuse University; LL.M., 1971, Harvard Law School.
1. Lazarus, "The New Colossus" (inscribed on the Statue of Liberty).
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1977).
3. SuBcoMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMrMENTs IN
CALIFORNIA-A BACKGROUND DoCuMENT (1966Y.
4. E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS 1 (1972). For a description of
the civil commitment practice in San Francisco prior to the enactment of the
process, society attempts to further both the police power objective
of confining the dangerous and the parens patriae objective of treat-
ing the ill. Combining these different, and often conflicting, goals
into a single system creates the dilemma referred to in the title of the
legislative subcommittee's report.5 The subcommittee concluded:
[I]t is clear that the dual mental health objectives-treatment and
custody-can be better achieved in two separate systems. What is
required is a voluntary system for providing prompt and appropriate
assistance to citizens suffering from mental disorders without any
stigma or loss of liberty; and an involuntary system for identifying
and separating dangerous persons from the community, with full due
process of law, and providing them with such treatment and custody
as may be required.
6
In 1967, the California Legislature enacted the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act 7 (LPS),8 embodying the subcommittee's recommenda-
tions.' LPS, which became operative on July 1, 1969,10 repealed the
major new legislation, see Note, The Need for Reform in the California Civil
Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REV. 992, 993-1002 (1967).
5. SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA-A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (1966).
6. Id. at 19-20. See also id. at 180. The subcommittee's commitment-court
survey determined that only eight percent of the individuals seen by the commit-
ment court appeared "dangerous to others," while 18% appeared a "danger to
themselves." Id. at 18. The subcommittee's survey of state hospital patients
determined that 90% of the patient population was classifiable as "nondanger-
ous." Id. at 19. "Further, among nondangerous patients, only 2 percent receive
individual or group therapy, 12 percent receive drug therapy, I percent receive
electroconvulsive therapy-while 41 percent receive 'milieu therapy' and 40
percent receive only long-term custodial care." Id.
7. Division 5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, entitled Com-
munity Mental Health Services, was added by the California Mental Health Act
of 1967, ch. 1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. -Stats., ch. 1667, § 36. Division 5 consists of two
parts: the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, §§ 5000-5401
(West 1972), and the Short-Doyle Act, id. §§ 5600-5767. The Short-Doyle Act
provides the legislative framework for the organizing and financing of "commu-
nity mental health services for the mentally disordered in every county through
locally administered and locally controlled community mental health pro-
grams." Id. § 5600 (West Supp. 1977).
8. Id. § 5000 (West 1972) declares: "This part shall be known and may be cited
as the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act." Nevertheless, the Act is more commonly
referred to by its even shorter title, LPS.
9. See E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS (1972), for an in-depth
analysis of the political process through which the subcommittee members and
their staff identified the problem, designed solutions, gathered public support,
and obtained the approval of the legislature and the governor. In discussing the
objectives of LPS, the Supreme Court of California noted that the legislation
was enacted after a two-year legislative study, citing the subcommittee's report.
Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 668, 464 P.2d 56, 57, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600, 601
(1970). One commentator has described LPS as the "culmination" of the sub-
committee's study. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California:
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 93, 98 (1974).
10. LPS was amended by 1968 Cal. Stats., ch. 1374, § 13, prior to its effective
date of July 1, 1969.
[VOL. 15: 201, 19781 Conservatorship
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
existing indeterminate civil commitment scheme, removed legal dis-
abilities previously imposed upon civilly committed individuals, and
enacted a system that emphasized community-based voluntary treat-
ment of the mentally disordered." LPS limits involuntary commit-
ment to a series of short confinement periods: seventy-two hours,
fourteen days, and ninety days. The progression in length of confine-
ment authorized varies directly with the severity of mental disorder
established and the stringency of procedural safeguards imposed at
each stage. If as a result of mental disorder, a person is believed to be
a danger to others, or to himself, or gravely disabled, he may be
detained for an initial seventy-two-hour evaluation period. 2 There-
after, he may be certified for a fourteen-day intensive treatment
period if any of these three criteria is determined to exist 13 and for an
additional fourteen-day period if the person is suicidal. 4 Finally, the
person may be detained for ninety-day post-certification treatment
periods, but only if he presents "an imminent threat of substantial
physical harm to others."'11
11. Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 668, 464 P.2d 56, 57, 83 Cal. Rptr.
600, 601 (1970). See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5600-5767 (West 1972) for the
statutes governing the organization and funding of community mental health
services.
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5150-5177 (West Supp. 1977) authorize a peace
officer or a member of an attending staff of an evaluation facility who has
probable cause to believe that the individual's condition meets the specified
criteria to take him into custody and detain him for 72 hours of evaluation and
treatment. Id. §§ 5200-5213 provide for a court-ordered 72-hour evaluation and
treatment hold as an alternative. Id. § 5525-5530 (West 1972) authorize a court-
ordered 72-hour evaluation and treatment hold for criminal defendants who, as
a result of chronic alcoholism or the use of narcotics or restricted drugs, meet
the specified criteria.
13. Id. §§ 5250-5258 (West Supp. 1977).
14. Id. 99 5260-5265. Id. § 5260 (West 1972) narrowly defines a suicidal person
as one
who, as a result of mental disorder, or impairment by chronic alcohol-
ism, during the 14-day period or the 72-hour evaluation period,
threatened or attempted to take his own life or who was detained for
evaluation and treatment because he threatened or attempted to take
his own life and who continues to present an imminent threat of taking
his own life ....
15. Id. 99 5300-5306 (West Supp. 1977). LPS articulates criteria limiting the
appropriateness of 90-day holds to a small group of demonstrably dangerous,
physically assaultive individuals. For an initial 90-day hold, id. § 5300 (West
1972) requires a finding that the person:
(a) Has threatened, attempted, or inflictdd physical harm upon the
person of another after having been taken into custody for evaluation
and treatment, and who, as a result of mental disorder, presents an
imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others, or
The seventy-two-hour evaluation provisions authorize detention
without judicial review.16 The fourteen-day intensive treatment cer-
tification provisions, and the additional fourteen-day recertification
provisions for suicidal patients, require that the person certified
receive notice" and be informed of his rights to counsel and to
judicial review by habeas corpus.'8 The ninety-day post-certification
provisions require a court hearing prior to a detention order. 19 At this
hearing the prospective detainee has a right to be represented by an
attorney and to demand a jury trial.2 0
LPS has been acclaimed "the Magna Carta of the mentally ill."
'2 1 It
has been lauded for its emphasis on voluntary, community-based
treatment 22 and its limitations on preventive detention. 23 LPS has
served as a model of progressive legislation, has been commended by
(b) Had attempted or inflicted physical harm upon the person of
another, that act having resulted in his being taken into custody and
who presents, as a result of mental disorder, an imminent threat of
substantial physical harm to others.
For subsequent 90-day holds, id. § 5304 (West Supp. 1977) requires a finding that
the person "has threatened, attempted, or actually inflicted physical harm to
another during his period of postcertification treatment, and he is a person who,
by reason of mental disorder, presents an imminent threat of substantial physic-
al harm to others."
16. See note 12 supra. For a more detailed explanation of the 72-hour hold
provisions, see Comment, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental
Health Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 851, 852-53 (1970). The article discusses the
importance of counsel during the 72-hour hold and recommends that compul-
sory counsel be provided during this initial detention period. Id. at 855-67.
17. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5253 & 5263 (West Supp. 1977).
18. Id. § 5252.1 (West 1972). See also id. §§ 5275-5278 (judicial review provi-
sions).
19. Id. § 5303. The statute does authorize the continued detention and treat-
ment of the individual in the intensive treatment facility pending a trial court
decision on the merits of the postcertification petition. Id.
20. Id. § 5302. For a more detailed explanation of the LPS commitment
criteria and procedural safeguards, see Note, Civil Commitment of theMental-
ly Ill in California: The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 93,
99-103 (1974).
21. The statement is attributed to Maurice Rodgers, spokesperson for the
California State Psychological Association. E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN
POLiTxcs 126 (1972). Other writers also state that LPS has been described as the
Magna Carta of the mentally ill, but they do not reveal the source of the state-
ment. See, e.g., Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 316 (1970) (statement of Dr. Roger Egeberg,
Assistant Secrefary for Health and Scientific Affairs, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare); Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disor-
dered Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 Hospi-
TAL & COmmuNiTY PsYcH. 101, 105 (1972).
22. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 316 (1970).
23. Id. at 266 & 278 (statement of Bruce J. Ennis, American Civil Liberties
Union).
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authors24 and judges 2 5 and copied by other state legislatures.
26
Because the LPS model's bifurcation of mental health programs
into a voluntary system for nondangerous individuals and an in-
voluntary system for dangerous individuals is conceptually sound,
attempts to evade the LPS procedural safeguards for involuntary
commitment should be resisted.2 7 Such attempts have taken several
24. Two recent coursebooks print portions of the LPS statutes verbatim for
study by law students enrolled in law and psychiatry courses. In F. MILLER, R.
DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 175-96 (2d ed. 1976),
statutes from Wisconsin, New York, and the District of Columbia are also
presented. Id. at 196-225. The preface of this coursebook describes the Califor-
nia experiment as "innovative" and declares that LPS "must be considered
throughout any discussion of mental health programs." Id. at xvi. In A. BROOKS,
LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 769-76 (1974), editorial com-
ments and articles on LPS are also found. E.g., id. at 677, 691-99, 701,718, 767-69
& 801.
25. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742,753
(1969). Judge Bazelon noted that LPS "promises virtually to eliminate involun-
tary hospitalization except for short term crisis situations .... The procedural
protections it promises are impressive indeed when compared with commit-
ment proceedings in other states." Id.
26. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010-71.05.920 (1974). This legislation
was added by 1973 Wash. Laws, ch. 142, 1st Ex. Sess., and became effective on
January 1, 1974. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.930 (1974). For an analysis of the
Washington statutes, see Comment, Progress in Involuntary Commitment, 49
WASH. L. REV. 617 (1974).
27. A California legislative committee has proposed expanding 90-day com-
mitment holds to patients considered dangerous despite the absence of threats
or overt acts of violence. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PROPOSED PHASEOUT OF
STATE HOSPITAL SERVICES, CAL. LEGIS., FINAL REPORT (1974). The committee
cited testimony of several medical professionals that clinical judgment of immi-
nent danger should be given great weight in determining the propriety of 90-day
postcertification, even in the absence of a threat or overt act by the individual.
Id. at 38.
In my opinion, that proposal is premature. I concur with Dr. Alan Stone's
judgment that the available studies of the California model are inconclusive. A.
STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 64 (1975). Dr. Stone's
evaluation of the California data suggests that involuntary commitment of the
mentally ill on a dangerousness criterion should be further restricted rather
than expanded. He wrote:
Two percent of the patients were found dangerous to others and 1
percent were found dangerous to self at the hearing held at the end of 17
days. My own judgment is that if the hearing had been held at the end of
3 days; i.e., close to the time required by the Lessard court, those num-
bers would have been no more than doubled. Thus, involuntary confine-
ment based on the objective measures of dangerousness would affect
only 6 percent of those actually confined. Perhaps that estimate is too
low, but surely not by much based on the data presented ....
Id. at 64-65.
The legislative committee has also proposed vesting authority in a court-
appointed psychiatrist to decide the propriety of 90-day holds in individual
cases. SENATE SELECT COmm. ON PROPOSED PHASEOUT OF STATE HOSPITAL SERV-
[VOL. 15: 201, 1978] Conservatorship
forms. For example, mentally ill individuals -are often processed into
the criminal justice system as a convenient alternative to LPS civil
commitment.28 LPS's rigorous requirements 2 for securing a ninety-
ICES, CAL. LEGIS., FINAL REPORT 42 (1974). In my opinion, that proposal is un-
sound. The reliability and validity of psychiatric evaluations and predictions
have been questioned throughout medical and psychiatric literature. See the
authorities collected and analyzed in Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and thePresumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
693 (1974). See also A. STONE, supra at 25-40; Monahan, The Prevention of
Violence, in COMMUITY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13-
34 (J. Monahan ed. 1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerous-
ness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975); Steadman & Cocozza, We Can't Predict Who
is Dangerous, PSYCH. TODAY 32-35, 84 (Jan. 1975). Authors who reviewed theprofessional literature concluded: "[P]redictions of dangerous behavior are
wrong more often than they are right even in those cases in which the subject of
the prediction has actually done or threatened something dangerous in the past.And without such evidence of past dangerous behavior, predictions of danger-
ous behavior are even more inaccurate." Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and thePresumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
693, 749 (1974).
Given this demonstration of psychiatric inexpertise, a legislative decision to
substitute a psychiatrist's judgment for the court's judgment in determining the
propriety of a 90-day commitment does not further the LPS objective of due
process for those subjected to involuntary confinement.
28. Arrest and prosecution for nuisance offenses is regarded as a more reli-
able method of securing involuntary detention than is LPS civil commitment.
Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible
Side Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH.
101, 103 (1972). Other criminal-control mechanisms used as alternatives to LPS
include revoking probation for psychiatric drug abusers and then confining
them in the county jail, and finding criminal defendants mentally incompetent
to stand trial and then committing them for treatment. Id. at 104. But cf. In reDavis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 50 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1973), in which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that if no reasonable likelihood exists that a defendant
will recover his competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, he must be
released from confinement or committed pursuant to LPS.
In 1974, the California Legislature amended LPS to ensure that long-term civil
commitment could be achieved for mentally incompetent defendants charged
with violent felonies. This legislative response to In re Davis is defended inParker, California's New Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals Found
Incompetent To Stand Trial, 6 PAC. L.J. 484 (1975), and criticized in note 58
infra.
The existence of a "criminalization-of-the-mentally-il" trend has been
questioned. Dr. James Lowry, former director of the California Department of
Mental Hygiene, serving as a psychiatric consultant to the California Depart-ment of Health, conducted a study of 5,058 prisoners confined in the San Diego
County Jail between September 12 and October 12, 1973. Only 85 prisoners
showed symptoms of mental disorder. Of these, only 29 were diagnosed aspsychotic. J. Lowry, Mentally Ill Prisoners in the San Diego County Jail (Jan. 5
1974) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). In Dr. Lowry's judg-
ment, the data imply that LPS does not result in more mentally ill people being
processed through the criminal justice system. Id. at 9.
Dr. Lowry also examined instances in which prisoners were transferred to
mental hospitals for a competency-to-stand-trial determination. During the
study period, only seven of the 5,058 prisoners were so transferred. Id. at 6 & 9.As a result of a review of competency-to-stand-trial cases in San Diego County
during an eight-year period-four years prior to and four years subsequent to
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day hold can also be avoided by persuading mental patients to accept
voluntary treatment.3
LPS-he concluded that this device was not being used as a convenient alterna-
tive to LPS. Although the incidence of competency-to-stand-trial commitments
increased in the two years immediately following LPS's introduction, the num-
ber decreased in the third and fourth years to a level below the number in the
year before LPS became effective. Id. at 7 & 9.
Moreover, even if some data confirm the finding that the criminal justice
system is being used to deal with mentally disordered individuals, this use may
have socially beneficial effects. See Monahan, The Psychiatrization of Crimin-
al Behavior: A Reply, 24 HOSPITAL & CommuNiTY PSYCH. 105 (1973). Unlike the
mental health system, the criminal justice system forces society to confront its
level of tolerance of deviant behavior. Behavior that society wishes to prohibit
must be clearly defined and labelled "criminal" before it occurs, and the state
may incarcerate an individual only after he is convicted of engaging in the
proscribed activity. Id. at 106. Additionally, Dr. Monahan asserts that if mental
health professionals view imprisonment as a brutalizing experience for the
mentally disordered, their compassion should be expanded to the mentally
normal offender, and their energies should be spent in improving the criminal
justice system for all who are subjected to it. Id. at 107.
29. Quaere: How rigorous are the LPS requirements? For example, the
operative words of the LPS commitment statutes--"mental disorder," "a danger
to others, or to himself," "has threatened ... physical harm," "presents ... an
imminent threat"-are not further defined by the statutes themselves or by
court interpretations of the statutes. The term "mental disorder" is defined, not
very helpfully, in the California Administrative Code as meaning "any of the
mental disorders as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (Current Edition) of the American Psychiatric Association." CAL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 9, § 813 (Register 76, No. 19- 5-8-76). One author has asserted that
the LPS "definitional standards, while certainly more specific than those of
other jurisdictions, are still so vague that the psychiatrist can manipulate them
to assure that the individual will receive the benefits of "needed hospitalization
... ." Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: The Lanter-
man-Petris-Short Act, 7 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 93, 134 (1974). The data from one
study confirm the assertion that physicians' clinical judgments that a certain
individual needed treatment were a more frequent basis for initial admission
than the statutory criteria. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S
NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1971) 116 (1972). However, ENKI also reports
that the requirements for a 90-day postcertification order have been narrowly
interpreted by professionals, resulting in underutilization of this order. Id. at
155.
30. Studies in California and elsewhere have disclosed that under the threat
of involuntary commitment proceedings which may result in long-term commit-
ment, individuals who are in custody on temporary commitment holds are
coerced into converting to a voluntary status. See, e.g., ENKI RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA's NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1971) 121-22
(1972); Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66
Nw. U.L. REV. 429, 430 & 452 (1971).
Truly voluntary treatment is favored by the law. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5250 (West 1972), which requires as a condition for a 14-day involuntary
treatment certification that the person to be certified has been advised of, but
has not accepted, voluntary treatment. A similar condition is imposed for 14-day
recertification of suicidal patients. Id. § 5260. Nevertheless, the voluntary status
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Unfortunately, LPS itself contains statutes that can be construed
and administered to circumvent the fundamental objectives of LPS.
Through the LPS conservatorship device, the conservator may
"voluntarily" admit his conservatee to a mental health treatment
facility. Thus, involuntary treatment of nondangerous individuals
can be and is being achieved. Surprisingly, this device has not re-
ceived significant3 ' scholarly attention. This Article addresses the
evolution and current use of LPS conservatorships. In addition, the
adequacy of counsel in representing potential conservatees is evalu-
ated through a study of the conservatorship adjudicatory process.
OF GuARDIANsHIPs, CONSERVATORSHIPS, AND CONSERVATORSHIPS
The California Legislature has created three distinct but overlap-
ping statutory schemes to deal with the problem of individuals who
are either unable mentally or physically to provide for their personal
needs or to manage their property interests. Through the Probate
Code guardianship provisions, 32 a court declares a person incompe-
tent33 and appoints a guardian for the incompetent ward.3 4 Through
may be legally disadvantageous because of the absence of procedural protec-
tions imposed as a condition of involuntary commitment. See In re Buttonow, 23
N.Y.2d 385, 390, 244 N.E.2d 677, 680, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (1968); People ex rel.
Kamenstein v. Brooklyn State Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 57, 266 N.Y.S.2d 916, rev'd on
other grounds, sub inom. Kamenstein v. Beckenstein, 26 App. Div. 2d 669, 272
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966).
31. But see A. STONE, supra note 27, at 63-64; ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A
STUDY OF CAuFORNIA'S Nmv MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1971) 156-66 (1972);
Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary Treatment,
62 CAuF. L. REv. 671, 676 n.17 (1974).
32. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460-1462 (West Supp. 1977), as amended by 1976 Cal.
Stats., ch. 1357, §§ 5-13 (effective July 1, 1977).
33. Prior to the enactment of 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357 (operative July 1, 1977),
the guardianship statutes in Division 4, Chapter 4 of the California Probate
Code provided for the appointment of a guardian for "an insane or incompetent
person." Use of the disjunctive or between the words "insane" and "incompe-
tent" apparently did not signify that a guardian could be appointed for an
insane person who was not incompetent. Rather, the word or signified that a
guardian could be appointed for a person who was incompetent either as a
result of insanity or some other cause. In Sullivan v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 194,244
P. 343, 347 (1926), the Supreme Court of California stated: "The only thing
determined in a proceeding of this kind is that a guardian should be appointed
by reason of incompetency. Incompetency is but a preliminary step, but neces-
sary to support the order appointing a guardian." See also Estate of Hill, 1
Coffey's Prob. Dec. 380, 387 (1886): "But it is not clear to my mind that 'insane'
and 'incompetent' are ... convertible terms. A person may be incompetent by
reason of insanity, or from some other cause ... "
The California Legislature attempted to eliminate any potential confusion by
deleting the words "insane or" from §§ 1460, 1461, 1461.3, 1461.5, & 1470-1472 of
the Probate Code. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357, §§ 5, 6, 8, 9, & 11-13 (effective July 1,
1977). However, in an apparent oversight, the legislature did not delete the
words "insane or" in CAL. PROB. CODE § 1462 (West 1956). The oversight is
particularly important because § 1462 specifies the criteria the court must find
before it may appoint a guardian. Thus, the statute provides in pertinent part:
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the Probate Code 5 and LPS 36 conservatorship provisions, a conser-
vator is appointed for a conservatee 37 without an adjudication of
incompetency. Probate conservatorships do not require a finding of
mental disorder in the proposed conservatee;38 such a finding is,
however, a prerequisite to an LPS conservatorship.
39
California's guardianship provisions can be traced to the state's
first legislative session. Chapter 115 of the laws of 1850 authorized
probate judges to appoint a guardian of the person and estate of an
individual "incapable of taking care of himself, and managing his
property."4 0
.The guardianship device remained the exclusive solution to the
problem of personal and property management until 1957. Then, at
the urging of the State Bar Association,4 the legislature enacted the
Probate Code conservatorship provisions."2 The legislature was re-
sponding to the concern that the stigma associated with being ad-
judicated "incompetent" discouraged many elderly or physically or
mentally ill people from using the guardianship provisions even
though they were unable to conduct their affairs without assist-
ance.43 However, as enacted, the criteria for the appointment of a
probate conservator so paralleled the criteria for the appointment of
"If, upon the hearing, it appears to the court that the person in question is insane
or incompetent, the court must appoint a guardian of his person and estate, or
person or estate."
34. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1462 (West 1956). See note 33 supra.
35. Id. §§ 1701-2207 (West Supp. 1977), as amended by 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357,
§§ 25-35 (effective July 1, 1977).
36. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5350-5371 (West Supp. 1977).
37. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977), as amended by 1976 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 1357, § 25 (effective July 1, 1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West Supp.
1977).
38. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1976), as amended by 1976 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 1357, § 25 (effective July 1, 1977). See note 44 infra.
39. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West Supp. 1977). See text accompanying
notes 56-58 infra.
40. 1850 Cal. Stats., ch. 29, § 13, at 156-57. The statute has been revised and
codified and is currently CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West Supp. 1977), as amended
by 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357, § 5 (effective July 1, 1977). See note 44 infra. For a
discussion of the degree and nature of incompetency authorizing the appoint-
ment of guardians in various states, see text and cases collected in Annot., 9
A.L.R.3d 774 (1966).
41. Mull & Farley, 1957 Legislative Program, 32 J. ST. BAR CAL. 13, 23 (1957).
42. CAL. PROP. CODE §§ 1701-2207 (West Supp. 1977), as amended by 1976 Cal.
Stats., ch. 1357, §§ 25-35 (effective July 1, 1977).
43. 1 J. CAL. SEN. 487 (app.) (Reg. Sess. 1957). See also Lord, Conservatorship
vs. Guardianship, 32 L.A. BAR BULL. 5 (1957); Selected 1957 Code Legislation,
32 J. ST. BAR CAL. 501, 585 (1957).
a probate guardian that either could be appointed for a person who
was for any cause unable properly to care for himself or his property
or who was "likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or
designing persons." 44 The similar language in the two statutory
schemes caused one California appellate court to conclude that "for
all practical purposes a conservator, in the case of adults, is merely a
guardian under another name ... .,,45 One authority cautioned:
This law remainds [sic] me of the bank clerk who has his salary
reduced but was consoled with the title "vice president." If the ward
was really smart he might prefer to be called "incompetent" and be
protected by the guardianship law rather than be called "conservatee"
with less protection for his estate and with greater difficulty of being
restored to the management of his own property.
46
44. At the time the Probate Code conservatorship laws were enacted, the
Probate Code guardianship law authorized the appointment of a guardian for
an "incompetent person," who was defined as
any person, whether insane or not, who by reason of old age, disease,
weakness of mind, or other cause, is unable, unassisted, properly to
manage and take care of himself or his property, and by reason thereof
is likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons.
1931 Cal. Stats., ch. 272, § 1460 (current version at CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West
Supp. 1977)).
As enacted, the Probate Code conservatorship law authorized the appoint-
ment of a conservator for:
any adult person who by reason of advanced age, illness, injury, mental
weakness, intemperance, addiction to drugs or other disability, or other
cause is unable properly to care for himself or for his property, or who
for said causes or for any other cause is likely to be deceived or imposed
upon by artful or designing persons, or for whom a guardian could be
appointed... or who voluntarily requests the same and to the satisfac-
tion of the court establishes good cause therefor.
1957 Cal. Stats., ch. 1902, § 1 (current version at CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West
Supp. 1977)).
Both H9 1460 and 1751 of the Probate Code were amended by 1976 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 1357 (effective July 1, 1977), and the similarity in criteria for appointment has
become even more pronounced. Probate Code § 1460 is amended to authorize
the appointment of a guardian for an "incompetent person," defined as "any
adult person who, in the case of a guardianship of the person, is unable properly
to provide for his own personal needs for physical health, food, clothing or
shelter, and in the case of a guardianship of the estate, is substantially unable to
manage his own financial resources." 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357, § 5.
Probate Code § 1751 is amended to authorize the appointment of a conservator
for
any adult person who, in the case of a conservatorship of the person, is
unable properly to provide for his personal needs for physical health,
food, clothing or shelter, and, in the case of a conservatorship of the
property, is substantially unable to manage his own financial resources,
or resist fraud or undue influence or for whom a guardian could be
appointed... or who voluntarily requests the same and to the satisfac-
tion of the court establishes good cause therefor, or who is an absentee
Id. § 25.
45. Place v. Trent, 27 Cal. App. 3d 526, 531, 103 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 (1972),
language disapproved, Board,of Regents v. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047,
120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975).
46. 3 N. CONDEE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE - PROBATE COURT PRACTIcE 315 (2d ed.
1964). The author also stated:
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In 1975, the Supreme Court -of California distinguished the two
statuses and placed restrictions on the power of a probate conser-
vator. In Board of Regents v. Davis, 7 the court stated that through
the probate conservatorship law the legislature had attempted to
achieve two major objectives. The first was to avoid the stigma of the
incompetency label for incompetent individuals. For such cases, "a
conservator is merely another linguistic designation for a guar-
dian." 48 The second objective was to provide the legal protection of
conservatorship to people who need such protection but who are not
incompetent. The Davis court held that because the conservatee had
not been adjudicated incompetent,49 the imposition of a probate
conservatorship did not deprive him of the capacity to contract.
Thus, a probate conservatee's pledge of $150,000 on a-matching basis
for construction of a stadium for his alma mater was upheld against
his conservator's attempt to rescindl
LPS was enacted only ten years- after the probate conservatorship
laws became effective Because the criteria-for the appointment of a
probate conservator include both mental and physical disabilities,50
the need for creating a new conservatorship device in LPS is not
readily apparent. Research does not disclose a complete explanation.
The LPS background document contains- 204 pages, but it devotes
only four pages to the LPS conservatorship questionY ' The discus-
[T]he new [probate code conservatorship] law permits anythingthat can
be accomplished in a guardianship and goes much further...
The new California statute isin fact a complete modern guardianship
law furbished with new nomenclature designed to remove the sting of
such words as "incompetent," "guardian," "ward," and "mentally ill." It
has eliminated many of the-unworkable features of the old law, such as
delaying all action until the personmto be protectedhas-been personally
served with a citation. These changes were hard to obtain piecemeal. It
seems quite likely that this new Iaw-will eventually be used exclusively
and the guardianship section as to incompetents will fall into disuse.
Id. at 315-16.
47. 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975).
48. Id. at 38, 533 P.2d at 1051, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
49. The supreme court expressly disapproved the language of the previously
decided court of appeal decision, Place v. Trent, 27 Cal. App. 3d 526, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1972), that a probateconservateeis necessarily-incapableof making a
valid contract. The supreme court noted that in an appropriate case a probate
conservatee may be adjudicated incompetent "and hence without the capacity
to contract by providing in the order appointing a conservator that the conser-
vatee is a person 'for whom a guardian could be appointed' under the Probate
Code." Board of Regents v. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d 33, 38 n.6, 533 P:2d 104, 1051 n.6,
120 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 n.6 (1975).
50. See note 44 supra.
51. Suicoim- ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, AssEMBLY INTEIM COMM. ON
WAYS AN) MEANs, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA or MENTAL CoMMITMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA-A BACKGROUND DocuMENr 133-37 (1966).
sion clarifies only that the LPS conservatorship was designed to
provide continuing assistance in managing the affairs of those grave-
ly disabled patients who need such assistance following treatment
during a fourteen-day certification order.
52
LPS conservatorships parallel and supplement probate conser-
vatorships. In fact, LPS states that unless otherwise specified, the
procedure for establishing, administering, and terminating LPS con-
servatorships shall be the same as that for probate conservator-
ships.53 Nevertheless, the LPS conservatorship law establishes new
criteria 4 and procedures for the appointment of conservators, lim-
iting LPS conservatorships to those mentally disordered people who
are involuntarily detained on LPS commitment orders at the time the
LPS conservatorship process is initiated."
An LPS conservator may be appointed for a person "who is gravely
disabled as a result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic
alcoholism." 56 "Gravely disabled" is defined as "a condition in which
a person, as a result of a mental disorder,5 7 is unable to provide for
his basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter. '58 The LPS
52. Id. at 133. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
53. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West Supp. 1977).
54. Id. But see note 44 supra for text of 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357, §§ 5 & 25,
which amend Probate Code §§ 1460 & 1751 to conform significantly more closely
with the criteria for appointment of an LPS conservator.
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.5 (West Supp. 1977).
56. Id. § 5350.
57. This statute unnecessarily reiterates the requirement of "mental disor-
der" found in id. Quaere: Does the definition of "gravely disabled," which
requires mental disorder, limit the authority of a court acting pursuant to § 5350
to appoint conservators for people impaired by chronic alcoholism only to those
who also have a mental disorder? If so, why is the disjunctive or used in § 5350?
58. Id. § 5008(h)(1). 1974 Cal. Stats., ch. 1511, § 12, added subdivision 2 to § 5008.
The definition of "gravely disabled" was expanded to mean:
(2) A condition in which a person has been found mentally incompe-
tent under Section 1370 of the Penal Code and all of the following facts
exist:
(i) The indictment or information pending against the defendant at
the time of commitment charges a felony involving death, great bodily
harm, or a serious threat to the physical well-being of another person.
(ii) The indictnent or information has not been dismissed.
(iii) As a result of mental disorder, the person is unable to under-
stand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him ajid
to assist counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner.
Such expansion of the LPS donservatorship criteria is not warranted. In
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the mere
filing of criminal charges does not justify fewer procedural and substantive
protections against indefinite commitment than those generally available to
nondefendants. The Court struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause an Indiana statute that subjected mentally incompetent criminal defend-
ants to commitment standards more lenient and release standards more strin-
gent than those applicable generally to civil commitment.
California's attempt to create a new category of civilly committable patients-
a category into which only mentally incompetent defendants charged with vio-
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conservatorship process is initiated by the professional person in
charge of an agency providing comprehensive evaluation or of a
facility providing intensive treatment. 59 When the professional deter-
mines that a person in his care60 meets the statutory criteria and that
the person "is unwilling to accept, or incapable of accepting, treat-
ment voluntarily, the professional may recommend conservatorship
to the officer providing conservatorship investigation."'" The conser-
vatorship investigator is required to conduct a comprehensive inves-
tigation 2 and is authorized to petition the superior court for the
appointment of a conservator only if he concurs in the professional's
recommendation6 3 and if no suitable alternatives to conservatorship
are available.64 On the basis of this report or of the affidavit of the
professional who recommended conservatorship, the court may issue
an ex parte order establishing a temporary conservatorship. 65 Pend-
ing the conservatorship determination, the temporary conservator
may detain his conservatee in a facility providing intensive treat-
ment.66 Within five days after the date of the petition, the court is
required to appoint the public defender or another attorney to repre-
sent the proposed conservatee and to conduct a hearing within thirty
days of the date of the petition.6
An LPS conservator is appointed by the court if the court is satis-
fied by sufficient evidence of the need for the appointment. 8 Within
lent crimes can fit-is an obvious attempt to circumvent the requirements of
Jackson and should not be sanctioned. Proof of the commission of a violent
felony-that is, a finding of guilt in a criminal trial-is not, without more, proof
of the future dangerousness of the individual. Afortiori, proof only of probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed a violent felony £-ndan a-djudica-
tion of mental incompetence to stand trial do not in themselves justify a predic-
tion of future dangerousness and preventive detention of this presumably inno-
cent individual.
59. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West Supp. 1977).
60. In 1972, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West Supp. 1977) was amended by
1972 Cal. Stats., ch. 692, § 1, to permit the professional to recommend conser-
vatorship for a person who was not an inpatient of the facility if the person has
been examined and evaluated.
61. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West Supp. 1977).
62. Id. § 5354. The investigator's comprehensive written report to the court
"shall contain all relevant aspects of the person's medical, psychological, finan-
cial, family, vocational and social condition, and shall contain all available
information concerning the person's real and personal property." Id.
63. Id. § 5352.
64. Id. § 5354.
65. Id. § 5352.1.
66. Id. § 5353.
67. Id. § 5365.
68. Id. § 5352, incorporating by reference CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp.
1977).
five days after the hearing, the conservatee may demand a court or a
jury trial on the issue of whether he is gravely disabled. 69 An LPS
conservatorship terminates automatically one year after the appoint-
ment of the conservator, unless the conservator petitions for and
obtains a court order reappointing him for a succeeding one-year
period.
7 0
An LPS conservator has all the general powers and certain special
powers accorded to guardians and probate conservators.7 1 Addition-
ally, the LPS conservator may be granted the right, if specified in the
court order, of placing his conservatee in a mental facility7 2 and of
requiring him to receive treatment.7 3 This grant of power to confine
and to coerce treatment is unique to the LPS conservator, distin-
guishing him from probate conservators and guardians.
Statistical evidence supports the conclusion that this conservator-
ship device is used as an "escape hatch" to prolong institutional
confinement of nondangerous people.7 4 The California Department
of Health disclosed that in the 1972-1973 fiscal year, 36,133 individu-
als were detained on seventy-two-hour evaluation holds-of which
6,247 were detained on fourteen-day intensive treatment certifica-
tions--of which only eighteen were detained for ninety-day post-
certification periods because they were found to be imminently
dangerous. However, during that year 3,296 individuals were de-
clared "gravely disabled" and became conservatees. 75 Even more
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (West Supp. 1977).
70. Id. § 5361 (West 1972).
71. Id. § 5357, incorporating by reference the general powers specified in CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1852 (West Supp. 1977) and those additional powers in id. § 1853
designated by the court.
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1977) provides:
A conservator appointed pursuant to this chapter shall have the right,
if specified in the court order, to place his conservatee in a medical,
psychiatric, nursing, or other state-licensed facility, or a state hospital,
county hospital, hospital operated by the Regents of the University of
California, a United States government hospital, or other nonmedical
facility approved by the State Department of Health or an agency ac-
credited by the State Department of Health.
73. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 905, § 2, amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358
(West Supp. 1977). For the text of the statute, see text accompanying note 98
infra.
74. "Since the time constraints [72 hours, 14 days, 90 days] are obviously
arbitrary-when viewed against the realities of mental illness and the limited
service resources, it was inevitable that all the stresses for prolonging confine-
ment would be directed at that one escape hatch [LPS conservatorships]." A.
STONE, supra note 27, at 64.
75. Data entitled "Involuntary Detentions," prepared by the Program Analy-
sis and Statistics Section, California Department of Health, dated May 31, 1974
(on file with the author). Statistics released for the prior fiscal year (1971-1972)
were similar: 33,640 individuals detained on a 72-hour evaluation hold; of whom
5,319 were detained on a 14-day intensive treatment certification, Of the latter,
only 17 were detained for a 90-day postcertification period as imminently
214
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recent data reveal the use of the conservatorship status as a substi-
tute for the ninety-day post-certification hold in state hospitals. 76 On
June 30, 1975, the patient population of the California state mental
hospitals consisted of eighty-seven individuals on seventy-two-hour
evaluation holds, 337 on fourteen-day intensive treatment certifica-
tions, one suicidal patient on a fourteen-day intensive treatment
recertification, seven patients on ninety-day post-certifications, one
on a subsequent ninety-day post-certification, 282 on temporary LPS
conservatorships, and 1,225 on LPS conservatorships.
7
THE LPS CONSERVATOR'S POWER TO CONFINE AND COERCE TREATMENT:
CrWL COvaTrmENT WrHOUT THE CRUNCH
Historical Development
A guardian of the person has the care and custody of the person of
his ward and may establish the ward's residence anywhere in the
dangerous. In the 1971-1972 fiscal year, 2,613 individuals were declared gravely
disabled and placed under a conservatorship.
76. Patients committed on 90-day postcertification holds may be detained in
community facilities. However, because the postcertification process requires a
finding that the person to be confined is imminently dangerous (see note 15
supra), one would expect that many, if not most, patients on 90-day holds would
be transferred from community treatment centers to the more secure facilities
of the state mental hospitals.
77. Data provided by Jerome A. Lackner, M.D., Director, California Depart-
ment of Health, in response to a letter dated March 1, 1976, from James V.
Lowry, M.D., Chairman of the State Hospitals Utilizations Task Force of the
California Association for Mental Health (data on file with the author). The data
disclosed a state hospital patient population total of 7,011 on June 30, 1975. For
the 1974-1975 fiscal year, the data revealed that the state hospitals recdived
26,747 patients, of whom 13,746 were detained on 72-hour evaluation holds
without court order, 16 on 72-hour holds with court order (see note 12 infra), 958
on 14-day intensive treatment certifications, three on 14-day intensive treatment
recertifications, 18 on 90-day postcertifications, 433 on temporary LPS conser-
vatorships, and 767 on LPS conservatorships.
Statistics for San Diego County contained in data entitled "Involuntary De-
tentions," prepared by the Program Analysis and Statistics Section, California
Department of Health, dated May 31, 1974 (on file with the author), reveal that in
fiscal year 1972-1973, there were 1,662 detentions for a 72-hour evaluation, 976
detentions for a 14-day certification, no detentions for a 90-day postcertification,
and 209 LPS conservatorships. The statistics for fiscal year 1971-1972 were
similar: 1,495 detentions for a 72-hour evaluation, 728 detentions for a 14-day
certification, no detentions for a 90-day postcertification, and 162 conservator-
ships.
The number of LPS conservatorships in San Diego County has risen drama-
tically in recent years. In the six-month period of July 1 - December 31, 1976,
there were 575 LPS conservatorships established. In the first three months of
1977, there were 352 LPS conservatorships established. Quarterly Report on
state. 8 However, the guardian's power is not absolute. The ward is
not his prisoner and may not be constrained without just cause.7 9 For
example, a guardian may not order his ward detained in a mental
hospital. The civil commitment statutes set forth procedures that
must be observed in order to secure institutionalization of any per-
son, even if that person has been adjudicated incompetent and placed
under the protection of a guardian. 80 In 1926, the California Supreme
Court carefully distinguished guardianship from civil commitment,
stating: "Under guardianship proceedings no purpose of confine-
ment is contemplated. In fact, the adjudication of incompetency...
would not justify a commitment [of the ward] to a state hospital for
the insane. And this would be so even if the court had pronounced
him insane."'"
In 1959, two years after the probate conservatorship law became
effective, the California Attorney General reiterated this position. He
issued a formal opinion stating that the authority of the guardian of
the person to place his ward in a mental facility was limited by the
specific provisions of the existing civil commitment laws. These stat-
utes did not authorize the "voluntary" admission of a ward by his
guardian.8 2 Implicitly, the probate conservator also lacks the author-
ity to compel mental hospitalization of his conservatee. The probate
conservator is not statutorily granted greater placement authority
than the guardian of the person of an incompetent ward, and the
probate conservatee has not even been adjudicated incompetent.
In January, 1975, the Attorney General issued an opinion 3 stating
that a guardian may not place his ward in a "Long-Term Facility,"
which was defined as a "medical institution... intended primarily
for the admission of chronic mentally ill, or mentally disordered or
other incompetent persons. '84 The Attorney General noted that no
relevant, substantive change in the provisions governing the guar-
dian's powers had occurred since the 1959 Attorney General's opin-
ion.15 LPS, enacted in the interim between the two opinions, was
cited to support the Attorney General's conclusion. Because the LPS
conservator is given the powers of a guardian, the legislature would
Involuntary Detentions, submitted by San Diego County'to California Depart-
ment of Health, Quarters Ending Sept. 30, 1976, Dec. 31, 1976, Mar. 31, 1977.
78. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West Supp. 1977).
79. Browne v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 593, 600-01, 107 P.2d 1, 4 (1940).
80. Sullivan v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 193-94, 244 P. 343, 347 (1926).
81. Id. at 194, 244 P. at 347.
82. 34 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 313 (1959).
83. 58 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 50, 58 (1975).
84. CAL. ADsMN. CODE tit. 9, § 23 (repealer filed June 13,1975, effective 30 days
thereafter). "Long-Term Facilities" have been recatalogued as "Skilled Nursing
Facilities." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250 (West Supp. 1977).
85. 58 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 50, 59 (1975).
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not have expressly and separately conferred the mental facility
placement power on the LPS conservator, unless the guardian lacked
such authority.8 6 The Attorney General also stated that a ward
cannot decide to become a voluntary patient in a mental facility
because of the judicial determination of his incompetence involved in
establishing the guardianshipY
The LPS conservator's authority over his conservatee has not been
completely unquestioned. In December, 1975, the Attorney General
issued an opinion concluding that an LPS conservator may not con-
sent to medical treatment on behalf of his conservatee unless the
conservatee is unable to give informed consent because of his incom-
petency. 8 That the Attorney General intended to include psychiatric
treatment within the "medical treatment" terminology is evidenced
by his footnote statement that the definition of medical 'treatment
"'may be very broad. ' 89 Only Winters v. Miller" was cited as support-
ing authority. In Winters the plaintiff-patient was a practicing
Christian Scientist. Over her continued objection, she was given
heavy doses of tranquilizers, both orally and intramuscularly, from
the time she was admitted until the time she was discharged from
Bellevue Hospital.91
The Attorney General relied on Board of Regents v. Davis92 to
justify his conclusion that the LPS conservatorship adjudication
does not, of itself, determine that the conservatee lacks the capacity
to withhold his consent to treatment.
A conservatee, like any patient, may rationally understand the nat-
ure of the proposed medical treatment, but may refuse such treatment
for reasons which a conservator may think absurd. If no hearing is
held on the issue of whether the conservatee is competent to give or
withhold medical consent, both the conservator and the physician run
the risk of forcing medical treatment on a competent conservatee
93
Although, as in Winters, the right to refuse medical treatment
usually has been premised on first amendment religious grounds,
9 4
86. Id. at 58.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 849.
89. Id. n.2.
90. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
91. Id. at 68.
92. 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975). See text accompany-
ing notes 47-49 supra.
93. 58 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 849, 852 (1975).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
the Attorney General asserted a broader constitutional basis for his
opinion. "[W]e hold that the Legislature did not intend to deprive a
conservatee of his right to self-determination, right to be left alone,
and right to bodily integrity, all of which are fundamental rights
inhering in the right of privacy under both the federal and state
constitutions."
95
If the LPS conservator believes his conservatee is incapable of
giving or withholding consent to medical treatment, his remedy is to
apply to a superior court for an adjudication of incompetency pur-
suant to the Probate Code.
96
Until [an LPS] conservatee is found to be incompetent to withhold
medical consent, we have nothing more than a difference of opinion
between the adult conservatee on the one hand and the conservator
and the attending physician on the other. Absent such a finding, the
Legislature clearly did not intend to subordinate the opinions of the
conservatee to those of the conservator.
97
Apparently in response to the Attorney General's opinion, the
California Legislature in 1976 amended LPS to expand the conser-
vator's authority to force treatment on his conservatee.
A conservator shall also have the right, if specified in the court
order, to require his conservatee to receive treatment related specific-
ally to remedying or preventing the recurrence of the conservatee's
being gravely disabled, or to require his conservatee to receive other
medical treatment unrelated to remedying or preventing the recur-
rence of the conservatee's being gravely disabled which is necessary
for the treatment of an existing or continuing medical condition. 8
In another statute,99 the legislature clarified that neither an incom-
petent ward nor a probate conservatee may be placed in a mental
health treatment facility against his will.190 Involuntary civil mental
health treatment may be obtained for these individuals only pur-
suant to LPS-including the LPS conservatorship provisions.
Lack of a Theoretical Foundation
The status of an LPS conservatee is an enigma riddled with incon-
sistencies. Is the LPS conservatee a voluntary patient? An involun-
tary patient? Competent? Incompetent? The answer to all questions is
"yes."
95. 58 Op. CAL. AT'Y GEN. 849, 852 (1975).
96. Id. at 850-51.
97. Id. at 852.
98. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 905, § 2, amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358
(West Supp. 1977).
99. Id., ch. 1357, §§ 14 & 29, amending CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500 & 1754 (West
Supp. 1977) (effective July 1, 1977).
100. Quaere: If a person has been adjudicated mentally incompetent, is it
appropriate to consider that he has a "will" and that his will is to be given legal
protection to such an extent that it determines the propriety of voluntary mental
health treatment?
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California statutes provide that a mentally disordered adult may
apply for voluntary admission to a mental treatment facility and be
admitted into such facility if he is suitable for care and treatment
there. 10' Application for voluntary admission is made by the person
at a time when he is mentally competent to make it, 10 2 or, if he is an
LPS conservatee, by his conservator if his conservator has the court-
specified right to place his conservatee in a mental treatment facility.
A voluntary patient may leave the facility at any time by giving
notice of his desire to leave and completing the usual departure
procedures. An LPS conservatee may leave only if notice is given by
his conservator.
03
Although the LPS conservatee is, by statute, a voluntary patient,
other California statutes acknowledge that he is, in reality, an in-
voluntary patient, detained in the mental treatment facility because
of a decision by his conservator. As mentioned previously, in 1976 the
California Legislature enacted statutes declaring that involuntary
civil mental health treatment for incompetent wards and probate
conservatees may be obtained only through LPS. The statutes
enumerated the specific provisions of LPS that were applicable to
involuntary hospitalization and included the LPS conservatorship
provisions within the prescribed list.
04
Further evidence to demonstrate that an LPS conservatee is view-
ed as an involuntary patient is presented by the case of Aden v.
Younger"5 and legislation that followed. In Aden, a court of appeal
held unconstitutional California's statutes regulating the adminis-
tration of psychosurgery and electroconvulsive therapy. The court
ruled that once the competency of a voluntary patient has been
confirmed and the truly voluntary nature of his consent has been
determined, the state may not invoke a substitute decisionmaking
process. By so doing, the statutes infringed upon the voluntary, com-
petent patient's right to privacy in selecting and consenting to treat-
ment. After this court decision, legislation was enacted articulating
new procedures to be followed prior to administering electroconvul-
sive therapy on voluntary and involuntary patients. In distinguishing
101. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6000 & 6002 (West Supp. 1977).
102. Id. § 6000 ("at a time when he is in such condition of mind as to render
him competent to make it"); id. § 6002 ("who is at the time of making the
application mentally competent to make the application").
103. Id. §§ 6000 & 6002.
104. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357, §§ 14 & 29, amending CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500 &
1754 (West Supp. 1977) (effective July 1, 1977).
105. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976).
the two types of patients, the new law declares that an involuntary
patient includes anyone under guardianship or conservatorship.
10 0
The LPS conservatorship process may be initiated only if the pro-
fessional person who recommends that a conservatorship investiga-
tion be performed has determined that the proposed conservatee is
unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily. 10 7 Can it poss-
ibly be asserted that those conservatees who were able but unwilling
to accept treatment are voluntary patients?
The establishment of a conservatorship, even an LPS conservator-
ship, is not an adjudication of incompetency. In Board of Regents v.
Davis,0 8 the California Supreme Court held that absent a specific
adjudication of incompetency, the imposition of a probate conser-
vatorship does not deprive the conservatee of contractual capacity.
LPS conservatorships are merely one form of conservatorship. 109
Relying on Davis, the Attorney General concluded that absent a
specific adjudication of incompetency, the imposition of an LPS
conservatorship does not deprive the conservatee of his right to
refuse treatment.110
Although no statute declares that an LPS conservatee is incompe-
tent solely because he is a conservatee, legislation enacted in 1976
characterizes the LPS conservatee as less competent than an ad-
judicated incompetent person. The statute declares that an incompe-
tent ward may not be placed in a mental health treatment facility
against his will."' However an LPS conservatee may be involuntari-
ly 12 confined and treated on the decision of his conservator. Similar-
ly, the incompetent ward's "will" may be disregarded if he becomes
an LPS conservatee.
At a time when the law has become increasingly responsive to the
need for curtailing involuntary civil commitment of the mentally
ill,"3 California's conservatorship law has had an opposite effect.
106. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1109, § 8 (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7
(West Supp. 1977)).
107. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West Supp. 1977).
108. 14 Cal. 3d 33,533 P.2d 1047,120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975). See text accompany-
ing notes 47-49 supra.
109. With certain exceptions, the procedure for establishing, administering,
and terminating an LPS conservatorship and the powers accorded an LPS
conservator are governed by the Probate Code conservatorship provisions. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5350 & 5357 (West Supp. 1977).
110. 58 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 849 (1975). See text accompanying notes 88-97
supra.
111. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1357, § 14, amending CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West
Supp: 1977) (effective July 1, 1977).
112. The statute states that mental health treatment of LPS conservatees is
"involuntary." Id.
113. Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary
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Identifying the LPS conservatee as a voluntary, but involuntary,
competent, but incompetent, mental patient has resulted in an ex-
pansion of the civil commitment concept. In a typical civil commit-
ment hearing, the court examines the prospective patient's mental
condition and determines whether, at the time of the hearing, it
meets the statutory criteria for commitment. If it does, the person is
confined immediately. Under the LPS conservatorship statutes, the
court determines only whether, as a result of mental disorder, the
person is unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food,
clothing, or shelter."4 This condition of "grave disability" is deter-
mined to exist at the time of the court hearing and presumably will
continue to exist during the life of the conservatorship. However, the
court does not order commitment and, in fact, is not statutorily
empowered to do so. The finding of grave disability, in itself, is not a
finding of civil commitability. Rather, the finding results merely in
the appointment of a conservator." 5
All LPS conservators are granted the powers of a guardian.
116
Although a guardian is responsible for the care and custody of the
person of his ward, he is statutorily prohibited from placing his ward
in a mental treatment facility unless he follows the LPS provisions
for involuntary commitment." 7 This limitation on authority also
applies to LPS conservators unless the court order establishing the
conservatorship specifically grants the conservator the additional
authority to place his conservatee in a mental treatment facility and
to require him to receive treatment." 8
But what factual finding must be made by the trial court to support
the grant of this extraordinary placement power to the LPS conser-
vator? The statute provides no new criteria. In fact, the statute does
not even require that the court make any additional determination.
Apparently the finding of grave disability, although not statutorily
sufficient to warrant the court's commitment of the conservatee, is
sufficient to warrant the court's "delegation" of the commitment
Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 675 (1974). See also Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally IUI, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,1193(1974).
114. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5008(h)(1) & 5350 (West Supp. 1977).
115. Id. § 5350.
116. Id. § 5357, which incorporates by reference CAL. PROB. CODE §§1852 &
1853 (West Supp. 1977), which in turn incorporates by reference CAL. PROB.
CODE, §§ 1500-1561 (West Supp. 1977).
117. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West Supp. 1977), as amended by 1976 Cal.
Stats., ch. 1357, § 14 (effective July 1, 1977).
118. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1977).
authority to the conservator. The conservator's placement power, if
granted by the court order, is plenary. Subject only to his general
fiduciary obligations,11 9 the conservator may exercise it at any time
during the life of the conservatorship and for any reason.
The LPS conservatee's statutory protection against impropitious
granting of the placement authority by the court and impropitious
exercise of that authority by the conservator is woefully inadequate.
The conservatee may demand a jury trial only on the issue of whether
he is gravely disabled. 20 Because of the stigma attached to the status
and the possibility of incarceration, appellate court decisions have
required that grave disability be established by proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt"' and found by a unanimous verdict. 22 The cases in
which these issues are raised are before the California Supreme
Court.
At six-month intervals, 123 the conservatee may petition for a re-
hearing on his status as a conservatee124 and a hearing to contest the
disabilities imposed on him and the powers granted the conser-
vator.1 25 However, the statutes establishing the conservatee's rights
to these hearings neither suggest that the court that established the
conservatorship is required to make a new factual finding prior to
granting the conservator the placement power nor articulate a stan-
dard for determining inappropriate exercise of the authority by the
conservator. In the absence of legislative or judicial clarification, the
conservatee's petition, like the labor of Sisyphus, is apt to be an
exercise in futility.
119. Id. § 5350, incorporating by reference CAL. PROB. CODE § 1951 (West
Supp. 1977).
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350(d) (West Supp. 1977). The demand for a
court or jury trial must be made within five days following the hearing on the
conservatorship petition. A demand made before this hearing constitutes a
waiver of the hearing. Id.
121. In re Conservatorship of Johnson, 66 Cal. App. 3d 87, 135 Cal. Rptr. 740,
hearing granted, No. 77-43 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14,1977); In re Conservatorship of
Turner, 66 Cal. App. 3d 391, 136 Cal. Rptr. 64, rehearing granted pending
resolution of In Re Conservatorship ofRoulet, Civ. No. 38400 (Div. 2, Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 8, 1977), motion to vacate rehearing denied, Civ. No. 38400 (Div. 2,
Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1977); In re Conservatorship of Roulet, 64 Cal. App. 3d
719, 134 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1976), hearing granted, No. 77-20 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31,
1977); In re Conservatorship of Thorn, 4 Civ. No. 14737 (unpublished opinion),
hearing granted, No. 77-42 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 1977); In re Conservatorship of
Atkinson, 4 Civ. No. 14989 (unpublished opinion), hearing granted, No. 77-44
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 1977).
122. In re Conservatorship of Turner, 66 Cal. App. 3d 391, 136 Cal. Rptr. 64,
rehearing granted pending resolution of In Re Conservatorship of Roulet, Civ.
No. 38400 (Div. 2, Cal. Ct. App..Feb. 8, 1977), motion to vacate rehearing denied,
Civ.,No. 38400 (Div. 2, Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1977).
123. However, the statutes specifically authorize that a first petition may be
filed without the necessity of waiting an initial six-month period from the date
of the court order establishing the conservatorship status.
124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5364 (West Supp. 1977).
125. Id. § 5358.3.
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A Proposed Solution
In its dictum, one court of appeal attempted to explain the delega-
tion of placement authority to the conservator by asserting that the
finding of grave disability in itself justifies civil commitment.
As an additional safeguard against early placement, however, the
[LPS] Act gives the court the authority to delay actual placement in
favor of alternative treatment available to the conservator. This cor-
responds to the procedure in the usual criminal case where the jury
determines guilt which justifies incarceration but it remains discre-
tionary with the judge to commit the person, grant probation or im-
pose another penalty. The conservator's decision to place in a particu-
lar medical facility compares to the Adult Authority's decision to
confine a person committed to it in a particular custodial facility or on
parole .... 126
The analysis is dubious. Section 12 of the California Penal Code
states: "The several sections of this Code which declare certain
crimes to be punishable as therein mentioned, devolve a duty upon
the Court authorized to pass sentence, to determine and impose the
punishment prescribed.' 1 27 LPS imposes no similar duty on courts to
confine gravely disabled conservatees and grants no authority to do
so. 128 In fact, LPS declares: "Mentally disordered persons. . . may
no longer be judicially committed."' 129 The courts, lacking the author-
ity to directly commit a gravely disabled person, may not overcome
this deficiency indirectly by appointing a conservator and annointing
him with authority to do so."s °
A simplistic way out of the quagmire created by inconsistent legis-
lative provisions is for the courts to construe the LPS conservator-
ship law as an involuntary civil commitment statute. The committing
court could then delegate to the conservator its power to place the
126. In re Conservatorship of Johnson, 66 Cal. App. 3d 87, 94-95, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 740, 744, hearing granted, No. 77-43 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 1977).
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12 (West 1970).
128. LPS declares that its legislative intent is "[t]o end the inappropriate,
indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001(a) (West 1972).
129. Id. § 5002 (West 1972). LPS explicitly articulates those categories of
mentally disordered people who may be judicially committed. Individuals
under LPS conservatorship are not included in the listing. Id. § 5008.1 (West
Supp. 1977).
130. See In re Michael E., 15 Cal. 3d 183, 191 n.ll, 538 P.2d 231, 236 n.1l, 123
Cal. Rptr. 103, 108 n.11 (1975) (the court expressed a similar thought in ruling
that a juvenile court order could not authorize a probation officer who has
custody of a minor to commit his ward as a "voluntary" patient in a state
hospital).
conservatee and to require him to accept treatment during the life of
the conservatorship. The legislature could amend LPS to achieve the
same results. To the extent that this solution forces treatment on
competent conservatees it would be subject to constitutional at-
tack.131 However, even if these challenges could be overcome, the
solution is undesirable from a policy perspective.
LPS was designed to create both a truly voluntary mental health
treatment system for the nondangerous person without resulting
stigma or loss of liberty and an involuntary civil commitment system
with complete due process protection for the dangerous person.'32
Neither the existing system of involuntary civil commitment of the
nondangerous, gravely disabled conservatee without due process
protections nor the statutory modifications suggested above conceiv-
ably furthers either societal objective. Under LPS, confinement of
the dangerous is limited to ninety-day periods upon a court finding
of past dangerous behavior and imminent danger to others.133 Con-
finement of the nondangerous for one year periods upon a finding of
grave disability is absurd.
Individuals found gravely disabled cannot be legislatively
homogenized. Some are competent to make treatment decisions.
Others are not. Some competent conservatees may be willing to
accept treatment voluntarily. Others may not. The conservator's
placement power, if it is to exist at all, should be construed judicially
or revised legislatively to account for these differences. LPS conser-
vators should be authorized: (1) to place in treatment facilities as
voluntary patients only those conservatees who choose to be placed
there and who are competent to make the decision and (2) to initiate
involuntary civil commitment proceedings for other conservatees
when necessary in appropriate cases.1 4 Unless the conservatee is
judicially determined -to be an imminently dangerous person, in-
voluntary treatment of a gravely disabled person should be limited to
the seventeen-day maximum prescribed by LPS-that is, the seven-
ty-two-hour evaluation period plus the fourteen-day intensive treat-
ment period.
131. See text accompanying notes 88-97 & 105 supra.
132. SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA-A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 19-20 (1966). See text accompanying
note 6 supra for the full quotation expressing these legislative objectives.
133. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1972).
134. For example, id. § 5150 (West Supp. 1977) could be amended to authorize
the LPS conservator to initiate a 72-hour treatment and evaluation hold without
having to obtain a court order for such evaluation pursuant to id § 5200 (West
1972).
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LPS CONSERVATORSHIP LAW IN OPERATION:
THE SAN DIEGO EXPERIENCE
The Consequences of Conservatorship
In the spring of 1975, students in a seminar in law and mental
disorder observed the LPS conservatorship proceedings in the San
Diego County Superior Court.' The students examined the court
files of each case in order to correlate the cases heard with the
medical history of each potential conservatee. In this way, a more
complete and objective picture of the individual was obtained. Al-
though the data gathered focused primarily on the performance of
San Diego attorneys in representing proposed conservatees, the data
and anecdotal observations also provide valuable insights into the
conservatorship process.
The judgment that a person is gravely disabled and that a conser-
vator must be appointed is an extremely significant decision for the
conservatee. Even before a conservatorship is ordered, the mere
availability of the conservatorship option may result in substantial
intrusion and interference in his life. By statute, the treating physi-
cian who believes that a person in his care is gravely disabled may
recommend conservatorship only if the person "is unwilling to ac-
cept, or incapable of accepting, treatment voluntarily.' 13 6 The defi-
nite impression of many data gatherers is that the conservatorship
device is used to avoid the necessity of obtaining consent to treat-
ment from recalcitrant patients. One can only speculate on the num-
ber of people who are coerced into accepting "voluntary" treatment
by a threat to initiate the conservatorship process if the individual is
unwilling to accept treatment.
A temporary conservator, appointed by the ex parte order of the
court prior to the conservatorship hearing,'3 is statutorily required
to
determine what arrangements are necessary to provide the person
with food, shelter, and care pending the determination of conservator-
ship. He shall give preference to arrangements which allow the person
135. The study was conducted from February 19, 1975, through April 2, 1975.
However, proceedings conducted on March 10, 1975, were not observed by the
students or included in the presentation of data. On that date four hearings were
scheduled; in three, conservators were appointed; the fourth was continued.
I would like to extend a special note of appreciation and recognition to Mr.
Alan Brubaker for his assistance in developing the data-gathering question-
naire and directing the.study.
136. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West Supp. 1977).
137. Id. § 5352.1.
to return to his home, family or friends. If necessary, the temporary
conservator may require the person to be detained in a facility provid-
ing intensive treatment .... 138
When the law students examined the court files in the spring of 1975,
they discovered a practice that appears contrary to the statutory
mandate. In the study group of forty-five individuals under tempo-
rary conservatorship, only four were allowed to remain at home.
Twenty-four were detained at the county-administered mental hos-
pital (CMH), and the remaining seventeen were placed in nursing
homes, board and care homes, or similar institutions.
Another questionable practice concerns the process of selecting
conservators. A statute provides that the selection of a conservator
shall be subject to the following list of priorities: (1) the nominee of
the proposed conservatee; (2) the spouse of the proposed conservatee;
(3) an adult child of the proposed conservatee; (4) a parent of the
proposed conservatee; (5) a brother or sister of the proposed conser-
vatee; (6) any qualified person or corporation. 139 However, the stat-
ute also provides that the appointment of a conservator is not subject
to these priorities if "the officer providing conservatorship investiga-
tion recommends otherwise to the superior court.' 140 The conser-
vatorship investigator is required by a different statute to "designate
the most suitable person. . to serve as conservator."'
141
At best the statutory scheme is equivocal. The preferable interpre-
tation would require that the conservatorship investigator adhere to
the list of priorities as establishing the legislature's belief about who
is probably the most suitable person to serve as conservator in the
typical case. The investigator should deviate from the prescribed
order of priorities only if evidence justifying such deviation is pre-
sented in an individual case.
In San Diego County, the Office of Counselor in Mental Health is
designated as the conservatorship investigator. Almost invariably,
the conservator recommended by the Counselor, and the conservator
appointed by the court, is an institutional conservator-either the
Counselor in Mental Health itself or the Department of Public Wel-
fare.'42 In only one case studied was a relative-the conservatee's
brother-appointed conservator. Data released by CMH confirms the
nonuse of noninstitutional conservators.143 During the period of July
138. Id. § 5353 (emphasis added).
139. Id. § 5350(b), incorporating by reference the list of priorities in CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1753 (West Supp. 1977).
140. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350(b) (West Supp. 1977).
141. Id. § 5355.
142. A statute specifically authorizes the same public officer to function as
both conservatorship investigator and conservator. Id.
143. Data released by W.W. Stadel, M.D., Director of Medical Institutions of
San Diego County, in a conference with the author on June 16, 1975.
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1, 1974, through April 1, 1975, conservatorships were established for
461 people. 44 The Department of Public Welfare was appointed
conservator in 287 cases, the Counselor in Mental Health in 171, and
relatives or friends in only three. The Supervising Counselor in Men-
tal Health is unwilling to recommend spouses or relatives as conser-
vators because he believes that they may be a part of the conser-
vatee's problem and that they may lack both the knowledge of appro-
priate treatment facilities and the ability to effectuate a conser-
vatee's placement in these facilities.
145
Although relatives often contribute to a conservatee's mental prob-
lem, it is doubtful that this situation always exists. Surely the ap-
pointment of a relative as conservator is appropriate in a significant
number of cases. The Counselor in Mental Health's office could, if it
wishes, provide necessary assistance regarding placement opportuni-
ties to relatives serving as conservators.
The appointment of institutional conservators provides maximum
administrative convenience. However, whether the current system
provides maximum protection and supervision of conservatees is
questionable. A report on LPS conservatorships in Santa Clara
County revealed that a majority of conservatees had no personal
contact with their conservators, and in fact they did not even know
their names. 46 To prevent instances -of neglect, the courts in some
counties require conservators to meet with their conservatees at least
once a week. The Supervising Counselor in Mental Health stated that
the imposition of such a requirement on his limited staff in San Diego
would create an impossible burden.1
47
The conservatorship investigator is obligated by statute to "recom-
mend for or against the imposition of each of the following dis-
abilities on the proposed conservatee: (a) The privilege of possessing
a license to operate a motor vehicle. . . .(b) The right to enter into
contracts."' 48 In all the cases studied, the Counselor in Mental Health
144. During the nine month period, there were 531 applications for LPS
conservatorships; of these 70 were denied or still pending at the end of the nine-
month period.
145. Statement of H.N. Welborn, Supervising Counselor in Mental Health, in a
conference with the author on June 17, 1975.
146. Community of Communities, An Inquiry into the Operating Procedures,
Personal and Social Effects of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act in Santa Clara
County California (Aug. 1975) (unpublished report on file with the author).
147. Statement of H.N. Welborn, Supervising Counselor in Mental Health, in a
conference with the author on June 19, 1975.
148. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West Supp. 1977).
recommended imposing these disabilities on conservatees, and his
recommendations were always accepted by the court.
149
The conservator may place his conservatee in a mental treatment
facility only if the court order establishing the conservatorship spe-
cifically grants him the authority to do so. 150 In every case studied,
the court granted the conservator this placement power. Almost
invariably, the power is exercised.'
5'
Because CAII provides only acute psychiatric inpatient services,
the average patient stay in this facility is 7.5 days. 5 2 Thereafter,
patients are discharged to nursing homes or board and care homes. A
CMHI aftercare team circuit-rides to these facilities, interviewing
once every two weeks each patient who has been discharged from
CMH.153
The primary responsibility of the Aftercare Team is to supervise the
patient's medication. The preferred medication is Prolixine [sic], an
injectible which maintains effective blood levels for two weeks or
longer. The description of a typical day of activity by the Aftercare
Team to a large board and care home consists of interviews with
residents for an average of five minutes each by one of the Team's two
psychiatrists, a brief entry made in the patient's folder, and the admin-
istration of medication by the nurse.' N
David Owens, M.D., the senior psychiatrist on the CMH aftercare
team, estimated that eighty to ninety percent of conservatees placed
in aftercare settings received an injection of prolixin every two
weeks. He also stated that he sometimes prescribes six to eight times
the maximum dosage recommended .in the Physicians' Desk Refer-
ence. 5 To the extent that prolixin or other medication is used as a
149. Subsequent to the completion of the law students' investigation, § 5357
was expanded to require the conservatorship investigator to recommend for or
against the imposition of the following disabilities:
(c) The right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to the
conservatee's being gravely disabled.... (d) The right to refuse or
consent to other medical treatment unrelated to remedying or prevent-
ing the recurrence of the conservatee's being gravely disabled which is
necessary for the treatment of an existing or continuing medical condi-
tion.
1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 905, § 1, adding CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 5357(c) & (d) (West
Supp. 1977).
150. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1977).
151. K. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 40 (1976).
152. CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES Comm. & BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SAN
DIEGO COUNTY, REPORT OF A JOINT VENTURE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TAx-
SUPPORTED HEALTH SERVICES IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY 57 (Mar. 15, 1975).
153. Id. at 61.
154. Id. at 62.
155. Statement of David Owens, M.D. to San Diego Mental Health Associa-
tion Task Force on Conservatorships, Feb. 17, 1975.
The foreword to the PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE states:
The function of the Publisher is the compilation, organization, and dis-
tribution of this information. Each product description has been pre-
pared by the manufacturer, and edited and approved by the manufac-
[voL. 15: 201, 1978] Conservatorship
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
means of control 56 rather than of therapy, the practice infringes on
the patient's constitutional rights.
157
The processing of conservatees as a homogeneous group and the
activities of the CMII aftercare team can hardly be construed as
fulfilling the LPS promise of individualized treatment for the gravely
disabled. 5 8 Traditionally, nursing homes have been organized to
treat people convalescing from medical illnesses or to provide aid to
those-primarily the elderly--who require help in .bathing, dressing,
eating, or in using the toilet. Usually nursing home patients are either
confined to their beds or their activity patterns are limited. Placing
ambulatory mental patients-often young adults-in such a setting
may be inappropriate. The mentally ill may be subjected to massive
medication to control their activity and sometimes threatening be-
havior.1
5 9
The problem of young adult conservatees is important, for San
Diego LPS conservatorships are not used exclusively, or even
primarily, as a protective device for the elderly. In the sixty-three
cases studied, twenty individuals (31.7% of the cases) subjected to
the conservatorship hearing were under age twenty-six, and thirty-
six (57.1% of the cases) were under age thirty-six. Only fifteen
(23.8% of the cases) were over age sixty. An independent study of
turer's medical department, medical director, andlor medical consul-
tant.
Products described in PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE which have
official package circulars must be in full compliance with Food & Drug
Administration regulations pertaining to promotional labeling for pre-
scription drugs. These regulations require that for PDR, "indications,
effects, dosages, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of admin-
istration, and any relevant warnings, hazards, contraindications, side
effects, and precautions" must be the "same in language and emphasis"
as the approved labeling for the product. FDA regards the words "same
in language and emphasis" as requiring verbatim use of the approved
labeling providing such information.
Foreword to PnySICIANs' DESK REFERENCE (13th ed. 1976).
156. Prolixin has been described as "having an effect equivalent to a 'func-
tional lobotomy."' S. RumrN, THE LAW OF CRwVnNAL CORRECTION 601 n.135 (1973).
157. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Knecht v. Gilman, 488
F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). See generally Bomstein, The Forcible Administration
of Drugs to Prisoners and Mental Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379 (1975).
158. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1972):
The provisions of this part shall be construed to promote the legislative
intent as follows
(e) To provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement
services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled persons
159. A. STONE, supra note 27, at 93, citing Reich & Siegel, The Chronically
Mentally Ill: Shuffle to Oblivian, 3 PSYCH. ANNALS 35 (1973).
conservatorships established in fiscal year 1974-1975 confirmed the
law students' finding that a majority of San Diego's conservatees are
young people. 60
Although treatment practices in the community are of question-
able adequacy,' 6 ' the basic living conditions in community facilities
are undeniably inadequate. In theory, companion legislation to LPS
was designed "to create financial incentives under which a local
county would want to keep its citizens out of large State institutions
while providing alternative outpatient care.' 62 However, the at-
tempt to move the locus of mental health treatment to the community
encountered major financial difficulties. Only a small portion of the
savings realized from the reduction of state hospital patient popula-
tions was allocated to local treatment programs. 6 3 Additionally,
state hospitals did not coordinate with local services to provide
continuity of care for institutionalized patients prior to their re-
lease. 64 As a result, chronic patients released from state hospitals
overwhelmed existing services. 65 Dr. Alan Stone, citing a study on
160. Students pursuing a masters of social work degree collected data on a
10% random sample of 105 cases selected from the 951 conservatorship files in
San Diego County during fiscal year 1974-1975. The social work students con-
cluded: "The majority of the conservatees were young, caucasian, unmarried,
and with diagnoses of schizophrenia." B. Elliot, J. McKinley, F. Ruddick, M.
Thole, S. Woodworth, Conservatorship in San Diego County, 1974-1975: An
Exploratory Descriptive Study of Conservatees and Placement Process (May
1976) (unpublished masters thesis submitted to School of Social Work, San
Diego State University).
161. Serious gaps in service remain.... Until these gaps are filled, the
county will continue to see high recidivism rates in its inpatient wards
(nearly 50% in 1974) and will be subject to criticism that it is creating
'back wards' in the community by over-medicating patients and provid-
ing minimal rehabilitative services.
CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COmm. & BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SAN DIEGO COUN-
TY, REPORT OF A JOINT VENTURE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TAx-SuPPORTED
HEALTH SERVICES IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY 69 (Mar. 15, 1975).
162. A. STONE, supra note 27, at 60.
163. Statement of California State Senator Nicholas C. Petris, News and
Notes Section, 25 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 423 (1974). Senator Petris, one
of the co-sponsors of LPS, criticized
the state's administration for subverting the intent of the legislation in
order to cut state government costs. He warned backers of similar legis-
lation in other states to "make certain that you have local care, that
you're not just dumping people into the streets, and that you don't have
an executive branch that is going to adopt that kind of policy."
Id. But cf. Chase, Where Have All the Patients Gone?, HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14,20
(Oct. 1973), quoting a report by the California Department of Finance:
Since its [LPS's] implementation on July 1, 1969, the state's appropria-
tion for this program has increased from $53.5 million to $103.8 million
for fiscal year 1971-72-a 94 percent increase in only three years.
Costs are proliferating due to the autonomy of the local programs and
the lack of central control for the Department [of Mental Hygiene].
164. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL
HEALTH LAW (1969-1971) 117 (1972).
165. Senator Petris claims that 300 or more patients were returned to many
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the California experience, concluded that community mental health
facilities deteriorated as they confronted increasing numbers of se-
verely disturbed people whom they could not assimilate.' 6 A Califor-
nia legislative committee charged that the state discourages
operators of private board and care facilities from attempting to
create a truly therapeutic environment by reimbursing those
operators on only a "bare bones basis.
'16 7
Although California has been a leader in establishing progressive
mental health policies, other states are now adopting them. Conse-
quently, California's problems in implementing its policies are no
longer unique. The report of the United States Senate Subcommittee
on Long-Term Care attests to a nationwide trend of reducing state
mental hospital populations. During a five-year period, the average
daily census of these institutions declined forty-four percent, from
427,799 patients in 1969 to 237,692 at the end of 1974.168 This policy
of deinstitutionalization has resulted in placing patients "in for-
profit nursing homes or boarding homes which are generally ill-
equipped to meet their needs.
1' 69
The situation is a national disgrace. The wholesale dumping of the
mentally ill into local facilities that are unprepared to meet their
needs may mean that the patients are in a worse situation than they
were in the state mental hospitals from which they came. 170 In a
particularly telling indictment, the Subcommittee states: "The in-
evitable conclusion is that, at best, the quality of life in boarding
homes is marginal; at worst, it is a cruel and intolerable exploitation
counties with only four or five days' notice and with no coordination with local
mental health agencies. Statement of California State Senator Nicholas C. Pet-
ris, News and Notes Section, 25 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 423 (1974).
166. A. STONE, supra note 27, at 93-94. Dr. Stone cited a document by Council
for Community Action Planning, Inc., To the Lowest Bidder (Mimeographed
Materials 1971).
167. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PROPOSED PHASEOUT OF STATE HOSPITAL SERV-
ICES, CAL. LEGIS., FINAL REPORT 17 (1974). Other reports criticizing the quality of
local treatment include: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (CAL-
PIRG), WOULD You CALL TmIs HOME? 19, 76, 87 (1975) (reporting on nursing
homes in San Diego County); ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFOR-
NIA's NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1971) 54-62 (1972) (reporting on Sacramen-
to County); Chase, Where Have All the Patients Gone?, HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14,19
(Oct. 1973) (reporting on board and care facilities).
168. SUBCOI1.M. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
94TH CONG., 1ST SEss., NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN
PUBLIC POLICY, Supporting Paper No. 7, The Role of Nursing Homes in Caring
for Discharged Mental Patients (and the Birth of a For-Profit Boarding Home
Industry) 718 (Comm. Print 1976).
169. Id. at 752.
170. Id. at 717.
of helpless human beings, ranking with prisons and concentration
camps as a prime example of man's inhumanity to man.'
7'
San Diego's facilities are not immune from criticism. The Califor-
nia Public Interest Research Group conducted a five-month investi-
gation of San Diego county nursing homes and found that "the level
of care, attention and dignity received by patients in most homes
remains below an acceptable level. In addition, a few homes continue
to deliver very poor care and, at present, the system shows no signs of
bringing these facilities up to par."'
7 2
Measuring the Grave Disability of Counsel for the Gravely Disabled
Given the significance of 'the conservatorship adjudication, the
competence of attorneys representing proposed conservatees is a
critical issue. The law students who examined conservatorship pro-
ceedings in San Diego concluded that these lawyers were inactive
and ineffective in representing their clients' interests. The lawyers
did not consider themselves advocates in an adversary process in
which conservatorship was to be avoided. For example, of the sixty-
three court hearings observed during the study period, thirty-six
lasted three minutes or less, and only nine hearings lasted nine
minutes or longer.173 Ironically, the conservatorship hearings were of
a shorter average duration than the 4.7 minute average of pre-LPS
commitment hearings. 7 4 The criticism leveled at the commitment
hearings is equally applicable to the LPS conservatorship hearings:
One can only wonder what the court experience meant to more than
13,000 Californians committed last year. If the purposes of the system
are so confusing to the judges, doctors and lawyers who practice in it,
the citizens who come before the court for three or four minutes must
be completely bewildered. Many must believe that they are being
incarcerated for terrible deeds. 75
171. Id. at 753. The Subcommittee reported the following common character-
istics of boarding homes:
First, they are owned privately by for-profit operators (few are non-
profit or government-owned facilities). Second, they offer little in the
way of services or recreation or therapy. Third, the food they offer is
generally inadequate in quantity and quality and they often present
significant fire safety hazards. Fourth, they are not required to meet any
Federal or (with few exceptions) State standards. Fifth, unlike nursing
homes which have few and untrained personnel, boarding homes often
have no personnel whatsoever.
Id.
172. CALIFORNIA PuBuc INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (CALPIRG), WOULD You
CALL THIS HOME? 87 (1975).
173. The length of hearings is reflected in the following table:
Duration in Minutes: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 longer
Number of Cases: 8 19 9 4 6 4 2 2 9
174. SuBcoMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEmmA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA-A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 43 (1966).
175. Id. at 49.
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In fifty-nine of the sixty-three cases, counsel representing pro-
posed conservatees stipulated to the qualifications of the reporting
psychiatrist. In fifty-seven of the sixty-three cases, counsel
stipulated to the admission of the psychiatric report. In forty-two
cases, the proposed conservatee's lawyer asked no questions of the
reporting psychiatrist. In most of the remaining twenty-one cases,
the lawyer asked only one question.
In only one case did the proposed conservatee's counsel request
either the assistance of a psychiatrist or the examination of the
proposed conservatee by another psychiatrist. In none of the cases
did counsel for the proposed conservatee offer testimony of an inde-
pendent psychiatrist. In fifty-six cases, no questions were asked of
the proposed conservatee. In fifty-eight cases, lawyers neither pro-
posed alternatives to conservatorship nor even suggested that others
explore these possibilities.
The conservatee's counsel proposed the appointment of a particu-
lar individual as conservator in only five instances. In two cases,
counsel requested that conservatorship, if established, last less than
the one-year statutory maximum. Only once did a lawyer urge that
the proposed conservatee be permitted to retain his driver's license.
In no case did the lawyer resist the imposition of contractual disabili-
ty on his client. Most significantly, in only two cases did the attorney
oppose the court's granting the placement power to the conservator.
In sum, the court hearing in the typical conservatorship case is a
mere formality, rubber-stamping the decisions made earlier by psy-
chiatrists and the conservatorship investigator.
The absence of active counsel at many conservatorship hearings
would be acceptable if the lawyer representing the proposed conser-
vatee adequately prepared his case by interviewing his client, his
client's relatives, acquaintances, and treating personnel, by observ-
ing the psychiatric examinations of his client performed prior to the
hearing, by discussing with the Mental Health Counselor the latter's
evaluation of the potential conservatee, by investigating alternatives
to the appointment of a conservator, and by analyzing the appropri-
ateness of disabilities that may be imposed on the conservatee and
powers that may be granted to the conservator if a conservatorship is
established.176 However, observations of the law student researchers
176. A. STONE, supra note 27, at 59:
Surely some of the recommended attorneys' functions are social serv-
ice roles which far transcend what has traditionally been viewed as the
attorney's function. But if the attorney does not fill some of these needs,
and others lead to the conclusion that a lack of investigation and
preparation prior to the hearing, rather than a reasoned decision not
to contest conservatorship made after full preparation of the case,
accounts for counsel's inadequate performance at trial. Some law-
yers have stated that for $75-the amount generally allotted by the
court to appointed counsel in a conservatorship case177-- they will
make one visit to the client in the facility where he is detained, ensure
that the papers in the case are in order, and make an appearance at
the conservatorship hearing. Many attorneys do even less. Several
were observed meeting their clients for the first time at the hearing
itself. Court psychiatrists reported that appointed counsel are almost
never present at the psychiatric evaluation of their client that is
performed a few days prior to the hearing, although the lawyers are
permitted to attend. The psychiatrists also stated that most attorneys
do not examine the psychiatric report prior to the hearing, despite
the fact that the report is almost always entered into evidence upon
stipulation and is often the most significant evidence in the case
supporting the appointment of a conservator. Some attorneys have
expressed the concern that if they "make waves" at the hearing, they
will jeopardize their chances for future appointments.
Although some courts require that attorneys undergo special train-
ing in order to be eligible for the court's appointment list, the mental
health court imposes no such requirements. Any attorney admitted to
the bar is eligible to be appointed. On more than one occasion the
author observed an inexperienced attorney "learning" what was ex-
pected of him merely by attending conservatorship hearings.
Once a conservator has been appointed, the conservatee's counsel
usually considers that his job is completed. Lawyers rarely believe
that their responsibility to their clients continues during the one-
year life of the conservatorship.
The "Choice of Role" Issue: Reality or Rationalization
Professor Fred Cohen described the lawyer representing a pro-
posed patient in a typical civil commitment hearing as "a stranger in
it is unlikely that anyone else will; and without aid of counsel, commit-
ment can easily become a summary or self-fulfilling process.
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 455 (1966):
In the performance of these prehearing tasks the lawyer becomes a
mediator between the socio-medical model and the legal model. He can
and should perform the functions lawyers often perform in this media-
tional role: Interpret specialized information to the client and other
participants; advocate and negotiate on behalf of the client; clarify,
anticipate, and communicate effects of alternative courses of action;
and design and clarify policy. If the attorney fails to perform these
functions, in all likelihood they will not be performed by anyone.
177. In 1975, San Diego County paid $57,975 to lawyers representing proposed
[VOL. 15: 201, 1978] Conservatorship
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
a strange land without benefit of guidebook, map, or dictionary.'
178
This characterization is also appropriate for the proposed conser-
vatee's counsel. He too lacks tradition, experience, training, and
guidance in the handling of conservatorship cases.17 9 The attorney
who represents a mentally disturbed client may rely upon one of two
role models. The best-interest model holds that the lawyer should
determine his client's best interests and pursue those interests in all
judicial and nonjudicial proceedings involving his client. The tradi-
tional adversarial model holds that the client should make the ulti-
mate decisions in all matters and that the lawyer should advocate the
position expressly favored by his client. The existence of these seem-
ingly opposite role models, and the justifications supporting each
model, 8 ' are a major source of a lawyer's uncertainty.
Regardless of which model the lawyer ultimately chooses in repre-
senting a mentally disturbed client, he should begin the case by
assuming the adversarial role. An attorney is more comfortable with
this role, for it is the one he is accustomed to using when representing
nonmentally disturbed clients. In addition, it is a role that encour-
ages him to thoroughly investigate the case, questioning as only a
lawyer can, the assertions, statements, and opinions of all parties and
conservatees in 742 hearings. These attorneys were paid at a base rate of $75 per
case, up from $50 per case in 1974. Extra payment was allotted when con-
tinuances were granted or when attorneys could convince the judge that extra
work or extra expenses warranted such payment. Typically an attorney was
assigned to two cases at the time his name rotated up for appointment, a process
which occurred approximately every six months.
178. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Men-
tally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 424 (1966). See also STONE, supra note 27, at 233-34;
Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical
Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1542 n.12 (1975) (citing authorities).
179. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Men-
tally Il, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 441 (1966). See also, R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & H.
WEIHOFN, Mm NTAL ImP vmEr AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 241-42 (1968), for a
discussion of deficiencies in the representation of proposed wards in incompe-
tency determinations.
180. Justifications for the best-interest model:
1. Even though a mentally disordered client may outwardly resist help, his
words might not express his "true" desires because his mental condition affects
his judgment. The lawyer's independent judgment must be asserted because the
mentally disordered client lacks the capacity to make a rational judgment as to
what is his own best interests.
2. Most proceedings involving the mentally disordered client, whether they
be civil commitment or conservatorship, are intended to benefit the client.
Physicians are acting benevolently to help the client achieve what he would
want if only he knew his own best interests.
3. A lawyer who honestly believes that his client needs and would benefit
from commitment or conservatorship is doing a disservice to his client if he
witnesses in the proceeding. And finally, in most cases the conse-
quences of establishing a conservatorship are not sufficiently desir-
able that a client's best interests are served by an attorney who is
something other than an adversary opposed to the adjudication of
grave disability.181
However, the real ethical issue is not: Should I adopt the best-
interest model or should I adopt the adversarial model? It is rather:
Am I willing to adequately prepare in order to understand and safe-
guard the interests of my client? Without that adequate preparation
no lawyer can competently represent his client.
182
The problem of inadequate representation of proposed conser-
vatees is more complicated than attorneys' concern over role-model
confusion or claims of insufficient compensation in conservatorship
cases. 8 3 The infusion of additional funds into the current system
advocates a position contrary to his client's own welfare. For example, a lawyer
who attempts to defeat a commitment petition for a client with suicidal tenden-
cies or who is too old to care for himself is offering the client not "freedom" but
death.
Justifications for the adversarial model:
1. Mental disorder and incompetence are not synonomous. Many persons
who suffer a mental disability may nevertheless be entirely competent to make
rational decisions concerning their affairs, including the decision of whether to
accept or reject treatment for their mental condition.
2. A mentally disordered client's choice to resist treatment is not necessarily
a "wrong" choice.
a. Some mental conditions are not treatable.
b. There is little hard data supporting the efficacy of psychiatric
treatment.
c. Due to deficiencies in staffing and budget, not all patients get
treatment appropriate to their condition.
d. Institutionalization can reinforce and exacerbate the mental dis-
order.
3. Even a client's "wrong" choice is not necessarily an irrational choice and
should not be subject to interference.
4. The lawyer's role is that of an advocate; the decision as to commitment or
conservatorship should be left with the factfinder.
181. Recently, a number of authorities have urged adoption of the adversarial
model in civil commitment proceedings. See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers,
Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic,
and a Proposal, 45 Mss. L.J. 43, 44-49 (1974); Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal
Ethics,, and Professional Responsibility, 33 ALB. L. REV. 92, 115, 119 (1968);
Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerging
Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 827-31 (1974); Developments in the Law: Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1288-91(1974); Note, The
Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework,
84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1548-63 (1975).
182. "A lawyer should represent a client competently." ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 6 (1971). A lawyer is subject to disciplinary action
for failing to "handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances." Id., DR 6-101. "The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in charac-
ter. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id., Preliminary
Statement.
183. "fAin attorney's duty runs to his client, not the attorney's pocket." Phil-
lips v. Seely, 43 Cal. App. 3d 104, 117, 117 Cal. Rptr. 863, 872 (1974).
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would not ensure that lawyers have either the necessary knowledge
of the system or the willingness to devote adequate resources to these
cases. The problem is both educational and motivational. At a
minimum, attorneys should receive training in the conservatorship
process and be tested on their basic competence in the area. No
attorney should be eligible for court appointment without a demon-
stration of ability."4 At the hearing, the judge should actively ques-
tion whether the proposed conservatee's attorney has adequately
prepared and presented his case.
Systematic changes should also be considered. Rather than using
large numbers of private practitioners who handle conservatorship
cases only sporadically, consideration should be given to creating a
full-time conservatee attorney service. Experience with the public
defender model 185 suggests that a small group of attorneys who only
represent proposed conservatees and who have adequate psychiatric
and social work services to assist them will develop expertise in the
preparation and presentation of their cases and will pursue those
cases with appropriate dedication.
86
CONCLUSION
If a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, then what is
a foolish inconsistency? In the case of LPS conservatorships, the
answer is: dangerous.
Lawyers who represent proposed conservatees have a tremendous
opportunity to question and challenge the way in which society
treats and mistreats these unfortunates and to begin to reform the
system. A lawyer who undertakes the representation of these or any
mentally disturbed client has the responsibility to make the most of
that opportunity. He owes that obligation not only to society or to the
legal profession, or even to his client; he also owes that obligation to
himself as a human being who cares about the troubled people
around him.
184. Merely because a county has not established a public defender's-office,
all members of the bar do not have a right to be appointed to represent indigents
at public expense. Id. at 115, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
185. See Comment, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and
Public Defender Systems, 49 N.C.L. REV. 705 (1971).
186. For a more detailed discussion of this model of client representation in
civil commitment proceedings, see Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel
for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45
Miss. L.J. 43, 75-91 (1974); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment
Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CALF. L. REV. 816, 819-39 (1974).

